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The Paradox of Middle-Class Attitudes in 
China: Democracy, Social Stability, and 
Reform
Ying MIAO 
Abstract: This article explores the seemingly paradoxical attitudes of 
the Chinese middle class towards democracy, social stability, and 
reform. Using fieldwork data from Ningbo, this article shows that a 
group of objective, middle-class individuals can concurrently display 
high levels of support for democratic principles and low levels of 
participation in real-life socio-political events. Being generally confi-
dent in China’s social stability, these individuals have little to no de-
sire for significant democratic reform, or indeed any reform that oc-
curs outside the purview of the state, as it is considered destabilising. 
By highlighting the distinction between how these members of the 
middle class respond to generic democratic concepts, real-life socio-
political affairs, and the idea of democratic reform, this article argues 
that the Chinese middle class are aware of what “should be,” what 
“could be,” and what “is,” which lends their socio-political attitudes a 
paradoxical appearance.  
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Introduction 
Despite being ascribed important modernising functions in history 
(Fukuyama and Bloom 1989; Easterly 2001), the political outcome of 
the middle class in developing nations is a contested one. One of the 
most debated arenas is in China, where the increasing number of 
affluent city-dwellers have been described both as “not afraid to get 
political” in scholarly and comment pieces alike, (Li 2003; Tang 2011; 
Fukuyama 2013; Wasserstrom 2008) and as having a keen vested 
interest in the state and the existing socio-political order (Chen 2013; 
Tomba 2009; Goodman 2014). Moreover, there is considerable de-
bate on the size of the Chinese middle class in terms of who should 
be included and, indeed, whether one exists at all (Goodman 2012; 
Guo 2008). Due to differences in definitions and observational angles, 
the Chinese middle class appear to exhibit varying, sometimes para-
doxical political attitudes (Tang, Woods, and Zhao 2009; Sonoda 
2010; Li Chunling 2010; Li Cheng 2010). 
One of the key reasons behind such discrepancies is that these 
studies are, by and large, top-down and macro-oriented. In order to 
draw these conclusions, the middle class need to be viewed as a large-
ly homogeneous group, sharing similar collective interests arising out 
of their similar socio-economic positions. The factors which influ-
ence their attitudes and behaviour are largely external: their socio-
economic circumstances (how they became “middle”) and their so-
cio-political freedoms (whether they can act upon their “middle-
ness”). Yet, this is a gross simplification of matters. Even without 
digressing into the politically charged and intellectually varied debate 
on the definition and relevance of class, it is not difficult to imagine 
that the answer to the question What do the Chinese middle class think? is 
not a simple binary one. In fact, the key question here is not so much 
what they think, but why, and more importantly, how their attitudes 
might vary in different contexts. Previous studies on middle-class 
attitudes have, by and large, focused their questions and surveys on 
abstract concepts such as liberty, rights, and democracy, or general 
questions on the nature and extent of middle-class political participa-
tion without qualifying, or delving into, the details of what people 
think they will do, or what they have done, in the context of specific 
events, or how people react to certain topics. This makes sampled 
answers prone to social desirability bias, and often results in mis-
matches between abstract and concrete thinking.  
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This article seeks to overcome the current state of binary analysis 
in middle-class political studies by offering a fresh look at the differ-
ences in middle-class attitudes towards abstract concepts of democra-
cy, real-life socio-political events that require mass participation, and 
the prospect of democratic reform. Using the city of Ningbo as a case 
study, this article examines a group of urban, affluent individuals who 
fit the conventional middle-class criteria and would otherwise be 
considered part of the broad category of the “middle class.” A total 
of 182 individuals were questioned via Internet survey about their 
attitudes towards abstract political principles and then about their 
participation in the Zhenhai PX incident, the largest mobilisation of 
ordinary citizens around a politically charged topic the city has wit-
nessed in decades. A further 19 individuals were drawn from the 
respondent pool and interviewed about their views towards China’s 
socio-political stability and the prospect of democratic reform as a 
whole. In response, these participants exhibited a high level of sup-
port for democratic principles, but a low level of desire for radical 
political reform or indeed any reform outside the purview of the 
state. Rather than reverting to, and depending fully on, the “vested 
interest” thesis, this paper highlights the distinction between respond-
ents’ attitudes towards generic political concepts, real-life socio-pol-
itical events, and the actual prospect of political reform and shows that 
these members of the urban affluent are particularly adept at differen-
tiating between what “should be,” what “could be,” and what “is.” 
Due to their education and socio-economic position, they are typically 
aware of and accepting of democratic concepts; however, they also 
(believe themselves to) have a sound knowledge of the socio-political 
environment at large and are aware of the distinction between the 
desirability of a concept and the feasibility of its implementation. This 
distinction in their attitudes can serve to shed light on the seemingly 
contradictory attitudes of the Chinese middle class presented in previ-
ous literature: they are both able to recognise the merits of democratic 
reform in principle and express caution in its real-life endorsement. 
This cautious attitude represents neither a simple deference to, nor a 
fear of, the Chinese state, but rather a calculated response to the cur-
rent status quo (stability) versus the risks of reform (instability). As 
they remain observant of China’s socio-political setting, their relation-
ship with the Chinese state is likely to be integrative and reciprocal, 
rather than simply oppositional or subservient. 
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Research Methods 
In contrast to most middle-class studies, this article does not focus on 
inter-class comparisons across a representative sample of the popula-
tion, but instead examines a section of the middle-class population to 
explore their political attitudes from several angles. Adjustments were 
thus made in the data-collection method: for questions on general 
political principles and the PX incident, 182 respondents were re-
cruited via an Internet survey, not only because anonymity encour-
ages people to participate, but also because the requirement of Inter-
net connectivity automatically excludes those in unconnected rural 
regions, who are unlikely to be middle class. The respondent locale 
was limited to Ningbo via both IP monitoring and Ningbo-specific 
questions. Snowball-sampling methods were used to maximise re-
sponse: respondents were more likely to receive the survey through 
their expanded social network (deemed more trustworthy), and were 
allowed to retain their anonymity should they choose to participate. 
In the initial stages, the survey was distributed to the online messen-
ger groups of a large private corporate enterprise, a medium-sized 
real-estate firm, a medium-sized insurance firm, and a regional car 
owners club.  
Since the purpose of this article is not to argue the finer details 
of what construes middle class, respondents were considered middle 
class if they fulfilled one or more of three conventionally defined, 
objective criteria: household average income (2.5 times above the city 
average: approximately CNY 87,500 per year [Li and Zhang 2008]), 
occupation (white-collar occupations, as outlined in Lu Xueyi’s 10 
occupational strata [Lu 2002; Chen 2013]), and education (college-
level and above). The point is to show that the sampled population 
can be, and often are, referred to as “China’s rising middle class,” but 
they do not necessarily exhibit either of the binary attitudes presented 
in previous studies. There are a multitude of cognitive processes at 
work that influence respondents’ political attitudes, some of which 
are unrelated to their class positions or even class identity. Indeed, 
subjective class identity, while also gathered, did not appear to make a 
significant difference to respondents’ political attitudes. This further 
illustrates the need to consider the context of respondents’ political 
attitudes, rather than simply viewing the sample population as neces-
sarily sharing any coherent identity or attitudes based on their objec-
tive status. The final valid sample consisted of 182 objectively middle-
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class respondents (32 per cent were state employees, 46 per cent were 
men, 31 per cent were CCP members, and 46 per cent subjectively 
identified themselves as middle class). Of these, 19 respondents who 
satisfied all three objective criteria (nine were male, ten identified 
themselves as middle class, six were 20–29 years old, five were 30–39 
years old, four were 40–49 years old, and four were 50+ years old) 
agreed to be drafted anonymously for semi-structured interviews 
using questions about China’s political stability and reform. 
Attitude towards Democratic Concepts 
In order to uncover layered reasoning behind middle-class attitudes 
and behaviour, this study divides the lines of questioning on three 
levels. First, respondents were asked for their opinions on abstract 
political concepts similar to those found in large national survey sam-
ples. These statement questions derived from the East Asian Barom-
eter and the results are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Middle-Class Attitudes towards Democratic Concepts  
Statement 
Positive response 
percentage 
100% = 182 
Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people 
organise lots of groups. 26.7 
Measures to promote political reform should be initiated by 
the Party and government, not by ordinary people (???, 
lao baixing) like me. 
60.0 
Government leaders are like the head of a family; we 
should all follow their decisions. 18.3 
Political elections should have multiple, diverse candidates. 88.9 
Competition among several parties in election of 
government leaders should not be allowed. 20.6 
The general trend here is clear: when assessed as an objective class 
category, the respondents of this sample appear to be considerably 
liberal in their political attitudes. Their overwhelming support for the 
concept of civil society and multiparty elections is particularly not-
able. While support for multi-candidate elections is commonplace, as 
it is already in practice in China, the idea of multiparty elections is 
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usually met with caution, as China is a definitively one-party state, 
and to support anything else could be interpreted as a challenge to 
the current regime. Before we draw the conclusion that these mem-
bers of the Chinese middle class appear to have matured in their 
democratic outlook, however, we should pay attention to the idiosyn-
crasies presented in this sample: for example, 60 per cent of respond-
ents would still prefer reform to be led by the government, in spite of 
their otherwise “democratic” outlook. This deviation is most signifi-
cant because it presents itself as a major anomaly; it appears to be 
incompatible with respondents’ lack of support for the corresponding 
statement that “government leaders are like the head of a family,” 
which nearly 82 per cent of respondents in this sample did not agree 
with. In their responses to these two statements, those sampled seem 
to have two opposing preferences: it appears that they are simultan-
eously in favour of and against authoritarian leadership. What could 
have caused such an anomaly? In order to put these results into con-
text, respondents were then questioned about the Zhenhai PX pro-
test, as a case study of their real-life socio-political participation. 
Case Study: Zhenhai PX Protest 
From 24 October through 28 October 2012, a series of protests 
erupted in Ningbo over the proposed expansion of a petrochemical 
plant to produce the industrial chemical paraxylene (PX) in the dis-
trict of Zhenhai, a mere 15.5 kilometres away from the city centre. 
Paraxylene is believed to have severe adverse effects on health, and 
associated projects have been highly controversial nationwide. Other 
PX-related projects have been rejected in the cities of Dalian and 
Xiamen, due to similar protests over health and environmental risks. 
Emotional pleas and propaganda filled the Internet for weeks leading 
up to the protest, peaking on the weekend of 27/28 October. The 
following day, on 29 October, the Ningbo Municipal Government 
conceded and announced that the project would be halted indefinite-
ly, pending further review.  
Although the media (especially the foreign media) were eager to 
portray the incident as a “middle-class uprising” (Larson 2012; 
French 2006), China Daily stated that the protests were not inherently 
a rebellion against the government or even the project, but that the 
main grievance arose from a lack of information about the project 
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and government accountability for it (Yang 2010). Nevertheless, en-
gaging in such an event of mass mobilisation, as well as being in di-
rect conflict with the authorities, is inherently political, thus this arti-
cle’s enquiry into the nature of and participation in the PX incident is 
very telling of how respondents approached real-life socio-political 
events. 
A series of multiple-choice questions were given to the respond-
ents, who were asked to pick one or more statements that best 
matched their attitude towards and participation in the PX incident. 
Overall awareness of the incident was quite high: 65 per cent of all 
surveyed participants were interested in it. However, actual participa-
tion was very low: only 25 per cent participated online and a mere 6 
per cent turned up at a protest or participated in some way offline. 
This is consistent with previous survey findings that suggest that the 
middle class have high civic awareness, but low civic association 
(Wang 2008). No significant correlation was found between respond-
ents’ age, subjective class identity, and their participation. CCP mem-
bership and state employment status had a predictable effect on re-
spondents’ participation: those who had closer ties with the state 
apparatus were less likely to participate in such politically sensitive 
events. When examined against their answers to the previous ques-
tion set on abstract political concepts, it appears that respondents’ 
proclaimed political attitudes did have a degree of influence on their 
political behaviour, though not tremendously: a larger proportion of 
those who believed civil society to be disruptive felt disinterested in 
the PX incident as a whole, while those who saw the government as 
being like the “head of a family” were generally more disinclined to 
get involved, whether through discussion or online participation, by a 
margin of 15 per cent (see Appendix). More interestingly, those who 
believed that the government should lead reforms were more likely to 
participate online, but steered away from offline protest, while those 
who did not believe the government had to lead reforms engaged in 
more offline activities. This suggests that those who believed in state-
led reform initiatives saw online participation both as a legitimate 
outlet for their concerns and as being within the purview of the state, 
as the Internet is censored and monitored. Offline participation, by 
contrast, was seen to be an extra-state activity, and was thus less con-
doned by those who believe that the state has an essential role to play 
in the political process. Of course, the numbers of people who turned 
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up at the protests were nevertheless low. Due to the overwhelming 
support for multi-candidate elections, the high standard deviation 
presented for the statement “I participated online in the PX incident” 
is more of an outlier on account of the small sample size, rather than 
any strong correlation. 
The results of the semi-structured interviews with the smaller 
sample of respondents are more revealing, particularly in terms of 
how the interviewees remembered and explained the PX incident 
using their own rationale. None of the interviewed respondents be-
lieved the incident was an exclusively middle-class affair or that the 
middle class had played a prominent role in the events. Typically, they 
argued that people participated in the demonstrations because “a line 
had been crossed”: PX, believed to be highly toxic, was seen as 
“threatening people’s lives, regardless of class.” Often, they described 
the struggle as being between those who had a vested interest in the 
expansion of the chemical plant and those who had a vested interest 
in the safety and health of the local area. Some even thought that the 
middle class would be the least relevant party, since they would be 
able to move out of the area, leaving behind the poor as the most 
vulnerable to a polluted environment. One respondent argued that, if 
it were not for the fact that public health was at stake, people would 
never have taken to the streets to demonstrate against the plant. 
The imbalance between the potential repercussions from and 
rewards for participation was a major factor in interviewees’ decisions 
to opt out of the protests. CCP members and the employees of state-
owned enterprises and government institutions recalled how warnings 
against participating in the demonstrations were distributed to them 
through mass texts and departmental bulletins. Others stressed that 
they had a “normal life” at home, which they did not want to put at 
risk. Although they demonstrated a reasonably good understanding of 
popular political topics, these respondents preferred to keep their 
activities in the private sphere. Some respondents said that although 
they understood that those who took to the streets felt “their lives 
being threatened,” they did not share this sentiment, so they them-
selves declined to participate. 
During the interviews, it became clear that the interviewees had 
various different rationales to explain other peoples’ “active” behav-
iour and their own “passive” stance. Several respondents further 
identified the root of the problem as a lack of information dissemina-
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tion and transparency about the PX plant, but did not feel the protest 
had legitimate environmental grounds. They expressed compassion 
and understanding of the protesters’ cause, but were able to analyse 
the issue beyond the superficial call to rally. Some respondents be-
lieved that the protesters had been misled, not in terms of the out-
come of the protest, but in terms of the reasons for participating in 
the protests. One respondent argued that media exposure had put an 
unfortunate spotlight on PX, while many other more polluting chem-
ical projects were being left unexamined. Though the sentiments and 
motivation behind the PX demonstrations were generally endorsed 
by respondents, they made a distinction between “understanding” 
and “participating.” Many indicated that they personally would not 
have followed the protesters to the demonstrations, as they felt the 
risks of participation outweighed the benefits. 
It was clear that these respondents could readily acknowledge 
and accept the popular rationale behind the protests, but they also 
prided themselves in “being able to see beyond it.” As PX is believed 
to have adverse health effects, they could see that the public’s reac-
tion was to be expected; however, because they believed that the 
adverse health effects of PX had been greatly exaggerated, many re-
spondents felt the cause for protest had been sensationalised and 
they, therefore, saw the project as less of a threat than did the active 
protest participants. Instead, because they saw the struggle between 
industrial and commercial interests over this project, they wanted to 
disassociate themselves from anyone who appeared “rash” or “hot-
headed,” as they felt that these individuals were prone to manipula-
tion. Even though these middle-class respondents understood that 
protesters felt that “a line had been crossed,” for them, that line was 
still at some safe distance. Therefore, the costs of participating in this 
highly politically charged protest would outweigh the benefits. Never-
theless, the fact that they could sympathise with the protesters sug-
gests that if, one day, that invisible line were to be crossed, then they 
too might join others in open protest.  
Middle Class, Social Stability, and Reform 
Finally, in order to give more context to the results gathered above, 
respondents were asked to assess China’s current level of social sta-
bility and their own opinions on the role the middle class play in 
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maintaining or affecting such stability. Due to their sensitive nature, 
these questions could not be included in the larger questionnaire 
survey, but instead were asked exclusively in the more intimate setting 
of interviews.  
When asked to evaluate China’s present level of social stability, 
most respondents placed their assessment on the stable side of the 
scale – that is, they generally allocated a score from 6 to 8, where 1 
denotes complete instability and 10 represents total stability. It was 
unanimously agreed that Ningbo is more stable than China as a 
whole, and respondents gave the city a score of at least 8 or 9 on the 
stability scale. The mild temperament of local residents and their 
propensity for undertaking money-making activities rather than ex-
pressing political ambitions, together with the prosperity of the re-
gion and its lack of natural disasters, were the primary reasons for 
respondents’ high levels of confidence in Ningbo’s stability, both at 
the present and in the long term. Of course, it is likely that, as they 
also belong to the population of Ningbo, these respondents might 
also ascribe similar favourable characteristics to themselves and also 
might subscribe to the same rationale for their own reticence towards 
political participation and reform. 
Generally speaking, respondents said they believed that the mid-
dle class would be stabilisers of society, rather than agents of change. 
This is partly due to their own casual observation of Western middle-
class societies and partly due to their own experience. Those who 
could remember a time of poverty often made comparisons with 
their past, arguing that they were the beneficiaries of societal change 
and thus would not endanger the very socio-political system that had 
brought about those benefits. The younger respondents were similar-
ly aware of the benefits that a state-sector job would bring. One re-
spondent related a story where even his most “rebellious” friend, 
someone who had often spoken against the state, joined the civil 
service at the first opportunity upon graduation. Thus, many re-
spondents expressed a certainty that the middle class would not be 
partial to extensive and uprooting reforms, due to their high living 
standards and state policies aimed at promoting these lifestyles. As 
found in many other academic works, they argued that the middle 
class would have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, since 
they are the “haves” of present-day society. 
  The Paradox of Middle-Class Attitudes in China 179 

None of the respondents subscribed to the idea of a “middle-
class awakening,” whereby the middle class would develop political 
demands on top of their socio-economic stability; instead, they ar-
gued that any motivation for change would come from defensive 
desperation, rather than proactive demands. The phrase “If you are 
poor you will think about change” (????, qiongze sibian) came up 
frequently during discussions, bringing to mind William Cobbett’s 
famous quote, “You cannot agitate a man on a full stomach.” Hence, 
many respondents praised China’s current efforts at reform and said 
that they believed these efforts would appease the minority within the 
middle or lower-middle classes who are not entirely happy with the 
status quo. If not, they joked, the middle classes can always “vote 
with their feet,” and emigrate to another country, where their political 
demands would be better met. Open calls for reform were seen as 
confrontational and the “worst strategy possible,” since they would 
most likely prompt an adverse reaction from the state. Respondents’ 
overall confidence in state-led reforms was reasonably high. Re-
spondents did not typically see the state as oppressive or autocratic. 
They emphasised that the leadership also sought stability and would 
allow for necessary reforms to maintain stability. Thus, it could be 
said that respondents’ goals and interests were aligned with the state, 
which they saw as a leader, as well as an ally, rather than an opponent. 
Indeed, the current leadership’s propensity for reform appears to 
boost respondents’ confidence in China’s long-term stability:  
I don’t think there will be any major instability and changes in 
China. When I was younger, I thought there was a good chance of 
socio-political turbulence, but now I don’t think so anymore. Es-
pecially with the new leadership, they are all talking about reform, 
and I think that’s great. Once you reform, you avoid the chances 
of a major upheaval. I think the new leadership knows this and 
this is their subtle way of saying, we need to change. (Anonymous 
1 2013) 
By extension, some warned that if the state undermines middle-class 
interests or if the middle class believe that the state is undermining 
their interests, then this mutually beneficial partnership might fall 
apart. The shrinking and devaluing of the stock market and financial 
products, together with skyrocketing prices in the housing market, 
argued some, are already putting pressure on the middle classes. With 
their savings devaluing in the banks and real estate becoming increas-
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ingly unaffordable, the very basis of the middle class – income and 
property, in the eyes of many – is threatened, along with the pro-
spects for stability. Nevertheless, the same respondents hastened to 
add that they themselves would not hope for instability or change, 
since it is always the lao baixing (???, the ordinary people), the 
overarching term with which respondents primarily identified – rather 
than referring to their class – who lose out in times of flux.  
Indeed, although some respondents were wary of the possibility 
of instability arising because the collective interests of the middle 
class had been undermined, none of the interview respondents be-
lieved that they themselves would be the instigators of reform. Re-
spondents’ personal attitudes towards socio-political change were, in 
fact, very reserved. Respondents typically took a stance of “passive 
acceptance,” claiming that, while they were aware that the status quo 
was not perfect, there was very little that could ostensibly be changed. 
Their search for “better alternatives” had so far drawn a blank, and 
any prospect of socio-political change was riddled with risks and 
unpredictable outcomes, whether imagined or real. One respondent 
drew a particularly vivid image:  
To go for reform now is like standing in a dark room with no 
light. Now you might be told there is a light somewhere in the 
room, but there are a hundred switches and only one of them is 
real, the others electrocute you. How would you move then? Of 
course you stay in the dark and stay where you are. (Anonymous 2 
2012) 
The younger respondents were particularly quick to disassociate 
themselves from “class consciousness” of any kind that might have a 
socio-political impact, while the middle-aged respondents highlighted 
their preference for focusing on their private lives, thus making them 
disinclined towards change. A distinction was made frequently be-
tween those people who “keep their heads down” and “go about 
their own lives,” a group of people with whom many of those inter-
viewed identified, and the “angry youth” (??, fen qing), the “50-cent 
army” (??, wu mao: a slang term for Internet commentators hired by 
the state to post favourable comments about party policy, so-called 
for the 50 fen (0.5 CNY) they allegedly receive for each post), and the 
“American saboteurs” (??, mei fen: a slang term for Chinese neti-
zens who “worship” the United States and are overly critical of Chi-
na) who are active primarily on the Internet. The former group was 
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seen as rational, calm, and unswayed by sensational headlines. They 
were also seen as not necessarily apathetic, but better informed. The 
latter were instead criticised for being rash and eager and for “rushing 
to the forefront of public attention whenever injustice arises,” thus 
being prone to manipulation. 
The older respondents saw the notions of reform and stability 
through the lens of their own life experiences. For them, the terms 
“political participation” and “reform” resonated with specific, histori-
cal meaning, which led them to believe that a recurrence of these 
themes was not possible, or indeed desirable, anytime soon. Even 
though the phrase introduced alongside the term “political participa-
tion” in the discussion was “reform” (??, gaige), many elderly re-
spondents substituted this phrase with the words for “revolution” (?
?? geming), a term which they then used interchangeably with “re-
form.” This suggests that the older respondents’ idea of active politi-
cal participation was a more radical and violent one, echoing the 
events of their childhood. This negative connotation was likely to 
discourage them further from supporting any future calls for reform.  
Meanwhile, a small number of respondents exhibited a certain 
level of pragmatism vis-à-vis the idea of proactive reform. They 
stressed that they would not initiate any demands for reform or 
change, but would evaluate any opportunities for reform should they 
arise. They said that action was warranted only if the timing, need, 
and leadership were right, in accordance with the Chinese saying 
“opportune time, advantageous terrain, and popular support” (???
??? , tianshi dili renhe); therefore, action was not required if the 
situation was “just a fussy scandal of no consequence.” Far from 
being the initiators of reform and active pursuers of change, these 
middle-class respondents preferred to take the role of watchful by-
standers, lest their actions destabilise the status quo. 
Together with their acute awareness of the existing opportunities 
and pitfalls in the current economic climate and the acknowledge-
ment of their relative success under such a climate, the respondents’ 
tentative attitude towards change and their hope for continued bet-
terment are perhaps best illustrated by one respondent’s reference to 
the famous opening line of A Tale of Two Cities, an epic story also set 
in a time of great transformation: 
People like me, I wouldn’t want instability, that’d be good for no 
one. Honestly, I think it’s like Dickens said, “It was the best of 
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times, it was the worst of times.” Right now, we can really make 
something for ourselves if we try, the opportunities are there. But 
society is evolving so fast, if you can’t grasp the opportunities or 
jumped on the wrong wagon, you’d end up being miserable. I 
don’t like change. If you look at the films and TV shows depicting 
great eras of change, they are all bloody and turbulent. (Anonym-
ous 2 2013) 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This article presents a multilayered look into the socio-political atti-
tudes of a group of urban, affluent respondents in Ningbo, who by 
conventional criteria can be called “middle class.” The results of this 
research reveal a divergence in respondents’ political orientation and 
their tendency towards actual political participation, as well as their 
reaction towards the prospect of democratic reform. On the one 
hand, when asked in general terms, the respondents showed strong 
support for political liberty, competitive elections, and participatory 
norms, all signs that might point to the “democratisation of the mid-
dle class.” On the other hand, however, when the topic of the PX 
incident was introduced as a specific case study, the level of proactive 
participation was very low and actual physical participation in the 
demonstrations was almost negligible. Furthermore, when asked to 
consider the prospect of democratic reform in China and their role as 
“middle class” within it, respondents almost always disassociated 
themselves from the reformative element and believed instead that 
they were the social stabilisers. 
This apparent paradox can be approached from several angles. 
First, it is worth reiterating that like other studies on this topic, the 
social group sampled here, despite fitting the conventional middle-
class criteria, were far from a homogeneous entity. The most promi-
nent holding factor for respondent attitudes towards democratic con-
cepts were, predictably, CCP membership and state employment 
status. This concurs with a wealth of previous studies on how the 
middle class, due to their socio-political origins inside, or institutional 
ties to, the party-state, will share different degrees of fundamental 
interests with the party-state and hence be unlikely to challenge the 
status quo (Chen and Dickson 2010; Tomba 2009; Tang and Unger 
2013; Goodman and Chen 2013; Chen and Lu 2011). However, such 
exogenous factors alone cannot explain why the same sample of mid-
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dle-class respondents presented such paradoxical attitudes, as the key 
lies not only in the features of their “middle-ness,” but also in how 
they rationalise different political choices in different contexts. 
Indeed, the point of this article is to show that a mismatch exists 
between how the same group of middle-class respondents approach-
ed abstract democratic concepts, real-life political events, and the 
concept of reform. Although their political attitudes are by no means 
necessarily representative of the Chinese middle class as a whole, we 
should pay attention to their varying levels of cognitive reasoning, 
which shed light on why the middle class have exhibited paradoxical 
political attitudes in previous literature. It is precisely because they, as 
middle-class individuals, do not share any coherent “middle-class 
characteristics” in their political attitudes that makes this subject 
worth exploring. Most importantly, it should be noted that the same 
group of middle-class respondents are capable both of recognising 
the merit of certain political concepts that are crucial to a democratic 
regime, such as civil society and diverse electoral practices, and of 
feeling justified in advising against the real-life implementation of 
these concepts. This level of pragmatic caution is not simply due to 
political apathy or fear of state retaliation. In fact, it is precisely be-
cause they have (or believe themselves to have) a good understanding 
of China’s socio-political environment at large that they have dissoci-
ated themselves from the “rash” elements advocating reform. Al-
though some respondents also warned that the middle class are not 
afraid of voicing grievances should the need arise, China’s most re-
cent change in leadership and its call for internal reform seems to 
have appeased them enough so that they do not think any level of 
social instability is likely. Thus, it appears that most middle-class re-
spondents equate democratic reform with instability, and vice versa, 
regardless of how they perceive democratic concepts in general. They 
are opposed to the idea of reform because of its potential destabilis-
ing effect and they could only foresee themselves advocating drastic 
political change in the face of extreme socio-economic grievances.  
The reason behind this line of thinking could be largely histori-
cal. The idea of people-based governance, dating back to Mencius (ca. 
300 BCE) and beyond, has always measured the legitimacy of the 
Chinese state by its ability to satisfy the people’s needs. Historically, 
this has been done with no political input from the people: it is a 
trust-based relationship in that the people grant the state legitimacy as 
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long as they feel the state is making decisions that are beneficial to 
them. Indeed, if the state fails to meet the people’s expectations, it is 
seen to have lost the Mandate of Heaven; hence, dissent becomes 
legitimate. However, unless the people’s livelihoods are genuinely 
threatened, the risks and costs of change are perceived to be too high 
to justify its potential rewards. Those who supported active participa-
tion in the PX incident, for example, typically argued that the project 
had “crossed a line” by endangering the health of the local residents; 
thus, the protest was seen as an appeal to the local government to 
hear the protestors’ grievances. Those who did not participate, by 
contrast, typically did not subscribe to the idea that the project would 
have any severe adverse effect on their lives, thus they did not feel 
the need to “take to the streets” in protest. This line of thinking ap-
plies only to real-life situations, not to support for democratic con-
cepts, as the latter requires no personal input or commitment from 
the respondent. This also explains why there is a mismatch between 
the middle-class respondents’ high levels of support for concepts and 
their caution about participation. As such, the key aspect of the state–
society relationship in China is still a social “gentleman’s agreement” 
(Ling and Shih 1998), whereby the state is expected to heed the needs 
of the people, instead of a social contract where the relationship is 
characterised by an exchange of rights and duties. Indeed, soon after 
the government announced that the PX project had been put on hold 
indefinitely, the protests were over. Consequently, decisions about 
political mobilisation and participation are made on a case-by-case 
basis (as opposed to group consciousness), as the respondents remain 
watchful over the state’s performance and judgement in tending to 
their needs.  
Therefore, the data presented in this article show that to imagine 
the Chinese middle class as holding the role of either social stabilisers 
or agents of change is to portray them as more proactive than they 
are. The respondents in this article are perhaps better labelled as 
“passive observers”: watchful at best, but extremely cautious about 
instigating change. Indeed, with the knowledge that they have about 
the current system, they are largely disinclined to change the status 
quo. This is, however, not as simple as stating that these middle-class 
people are conservative in their political outlook. It appears that they 
do not hold a particularly positive or negative view of the status quo, 
but rather see it “as it is.” For them, it is most important that they 
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understand the system and play well within it. So far, they still count 
among the beneficiaries of the system, so they are unwilling to change 
the rules or reshuffle society in a way that might harm their interests. 
However, this is not quite the class interest embedded in the party-
state that previous literature has explored. Rather, it is a universal 
interest in socio-political stability and their belief that the state re-
mains the actor most capable of upholding such stability. There is an 
inherent distrust of the “plebe,” the rash elements within society that 
they distance themselves from. They are against reforms instigated by 
the public, which they see as inherently destabilising. By contrast, 
they welcome top-down reformist agendas arising from within the 
party-state. This trust in the central government, but not in the gen-
eral populace, corresponds with a large number of surveys on this 
topic which find that levels of institutional trust among the Chinese 
are higher than those of social trust (Ingelhart et al. 2010; Yang and 
Tang 2010; Rao et al. 2013), and with a multitude of studies that have 
examined the mismatch between political dissatisfaction and regime 
support among the Chinese population (Chen et al. 1997; Ren 2009; 
Wang 2005). The middle-class respondents of this survey, certainly, 
are less likely to instigate change. 
Furthermore, this study has seen no evidence to suggest that 
these members of the so-called “middle class” view themselves as a 
separate political entity, one that is on equal or similar terms with the 
state. Their support for democratic notions is within the complex set 
of expectations they have for the state and it should be analysed with-
in those contexts. There is no desire or need for these members of 
the middle class to take proactive action, as they do not (some might 
argue, dare not) situate themselves opposite the state. However, nei-
ther will they necessarily always position themselves alongside the 
state. It might be presumptuous to assume that these middle-class 
respondents support the state due to their vested interests, because 
their expectations may very well change. So far, their interest in the 
state is largely economic, as they are the beneficiaries of the reforms 
of the last few decades. Such economic expectations are fundamen-
tally reliant upon socio-political stability, which is their number-one 
priority. Hence, the paradox between their beliefs and their behav-
iour: liberal in attitude surveys, conservative in political action, they 
are very adept at differentiating what “should be” (values of democ-
racy), what “could be” (limited state-led reform to minimise the risk 
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of social instability), and what “is” (the current reform efforts by the 
new leadership). In a sense, the state has met their expectations, and 
the legitimacy of the current socio-economic order can be estab-
lished. Should those expectations evolve, the state must adapt in or-
der to respond to them. So far, the path  being taken by the new 
leadership is deemed as promising: in tightening controls on the 
bloated civil bureaucracy, it has begun to address one of the key is-
sues of inequity in society, which has been met with approval. Yet, to 
address one side of injustice is inevitably to harm certain vested inter-
est groups; so, how the state chooses to balance these expectations 
could be the key to ensuring future regime stability.  
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Appendix
Involvement in the Zhenhai PX Incident (Survey) 
Statement*/ 
Factor* 
Civil 
society 
Govern-
ment as 
head of 
family 
State 
should 
lead 
reform
Multi-
candidate 
elections 
Multi-
party 
elections 
I was not interested 
in the PX incident at 
all. 
3.3 2.7 0.7 6.5 2.5 
I was aware of the 
incident but not 
interested in it. 
2.1 1.9 3.9 5.6 3.3 
I was both aware of 
and interested in the 
incident. 
1.1 1.3 3.9 0.9 6.0 
I participated online 
in the PX incident. 0.1 5.2 2.1 21.5 6.6 
I participated offline 
in the PX incident. 0.1 3.9 4.2 4.0 3.8 
Threshold** 2.0 3.8 3.7 11.7 5.4 
Notes: * Standard deviation of percentages of responses in the given category. Bigger 
numbers denote greater influence. 
** Standard deviation of all the factors affecting the same statement. Numbers 
greater than the threshold denote a strong correlation.
Threshold for Determining Significant Correlation 
In order to compare the relative correlation between various factors 
in relation to a number of statements, the standard deviations of 
“agree” and “disagree” of each statement amongst various factors in 
comparison were computed as shown in equation 3. Therefore, a 
small standard deviation amongst the responses of a factor towards a 
statement, illustrates a small correlation between the given factor and 
the given statement. In other words, no group of respondents sub-
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categorised under the given factor, demonstrated a particular prefer-
ence towards the statement. 
 
Correlation of a factor and a statement 
  	
				 
 
In order to determine the relative statistical significance of the corre-
lations between a multitude of factors and statements, the mean of 
the correlation of various factors to a statement was determined in 
equation 4. This illustrates the statistically expected background aver-
age of the correlations. The purpose of this is to determine the “noise 
floor” of the correlations, in order to prevent false positive correla-
tions. Any correlation results at or below the mean value  im-
plies the correlation is relatively statistically insignificant. 
 
Mean correlation of various factors to a statement 
  	 
where, n = 1, 2, .. m, represent n numbers of factors (4) 
 
Furthermore, the standard deviation of the previously computed 
standard deviations of n number of factors for a statement  
were computed in equation 5 in order to determine the relative corre-
lation amongst the correlations. 
 
Relative correlation   	
 (5) 
 
Equation 6 then utilises the relative correlation determined from 
equation 5 and the background average of the correlations from 
equation 4 to compute a relative threshold. Any correlation between a 
factor and a statement calculated from equation 3 with values greater 
than this threshold implies a correlation that is statistically significant 
in relation to all the other factors surveyed. 
 
Threshold to determine factors with relatively strong  
correlation =   

 (6) 
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